Social choice theory studies of how groups of people should and do make collective decisions. In this talk I will argue that modern logic can contribute to the study of social choice theory in many different ways, and I will substantiate this claim with examples from recent work by members of my group at the University of Amsterdam.
Social Choice Theory
Social choice theory (SCT) is the formal study of mechanisms for collective decision making. As a scientific discipline, it is usually considered to be part of Economic Theory, although it also plays an important role in Political Science and Philosophy. In recent years, furthermore its fundamental significance for work in Multiagent Systems has become to be widely recognised.
The archetypal problem in the field is preference aggregation: given the preferences of a number of agents over a set of alternatives, how should we aggregate these individual preferences so as to arrive at a single collective preference order? To see that this is not a trivial question, consider the following example. There are three alternatives, called A, B and C, and five agents. The preferences of each agent are modelled as a linear order over the set of alternatives:
The most obvious approach for obtaining a collective preference order is to use the majority rule: rank X above Y if and only if a majority of the agents do. If we follow this rule, then we must adopt A B (as three of the agents do), B C (as again three of the agents do), and C A (as four of the agents do). But this means that we get a collective preference order that is cyclic! This surprising outcome is an instance of the Condorcet Paradox, named after the 18th century political scientist and mathematician who first discussed it at length.
The question now arises whether there is a better aggregation rule than the majority rule, one that does not suffer from this paradox. Social choice theorists have approached this question using the so-called "axiomatic method": by formulating desirable properties of aggregation rules as "axioms" in a mathematically rigorous manner, they have been able to obtain results that show that it is impossible to find a rule that satisfies a certain combination of desirable properties or that a certain combination of such properties uniquely characterises a particular rule. Famous examples include Arrow's Theorem (showing that there exists no preference aggregation rule for three or more alternatives that respects unanimous choices made by the individuals, that ranks pairs of alternatives independently from how other alternatives are ranked, and that is not dictatorial); the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (showing that there exists no voting rule for three or more alternatives that does not exclude an alternative from winning a priori, that does not allow for situations in which a voter can benefit from submitting a ballot that does not truthfully reflect her actual preferences, and that is not dictatorial); and May's Theorem (showing that for two alternatives the majority rule is the only aggregation rule that treats all agents and alternatives symmetrically and that respects a basic monotonicity condition).
Applications of Logic
Logic has long played an important role in SCT: for instance, some properties of aggregation rules entail other properties, and impossibility theorems establish the inconsistency of certain sets of properties.
However, this use of "logic" is rather informal in nature. While it does refer to logical concepts such as "consistency", it does not make use of a formal language. In the sequel I will argue that logic, including formal symbolic logic, has many more applications in SCT, and I will substantiate this claim with examples from recent work by members of my group at the University of Amsterdam. 1
Representation of Preferences
Before we can tackle the problem of aggregating preferences, we need to decide how to model the preferences themselves. In classical SCT, preferences are taken to be linear (or weak) orders over the set of alternatives, but other types of preference structures are also of interest (see e.g. [4] ).
How to actually represent preferences, using a formal language, becomes critical when alternatives have a combinatorial structure, e.g., when agents are asked to express their preferences over all combinations of assigning truth values to, say, ten variables. (For an introduction to the field of preference modelling for social choice in combinatorial domains, see the expository article authored jointly with Chevaleyre et al. [1] .) One family of languages proposed is based on weighted goals: agents describe their preferences in terms of propositional formulas they would like to see satisfied, together with numerical weights indicating their
